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PROGRESS REPORT
ON
MARTIN'S TITAN III INCENTIVES 
(JANUARY 1963 TO MARCH 1966)
Robert W. Chapman
Incentive Review Monitor
The Martin Company, Denver, Colorado
Three years ago Martin started work on the Phase 
II contract for the development and test of the 
Titan III Space Booster. This was the first 
large aerospace system contract to incorporate 
multiple incentives for schedule, cost, and 
technical performance. Now, with the Titan III 
contract more than 90% complete, this report 
will evaluate the success of the incentives used 
and will compare incentive success with program 
results.
In consonance with the philosophy that the 
purpose of incentives is to motivate superior 
performance, this Martin/AFSSD contract contains 
definitive criteria for the determination of 
incentive success or failure. The contract also 
provides for a bilateral incentive monitoring 
system and requires that this monitoring system 
operate in a timely manner.-'- By this means, 
performance is quantatively measured at 
progressive check points throughout the period 
of performance. The responsibility for meeting 
the incentive criteria is assigned ahead of time 
by Martin's program management to specific 
individual work leaders whose success or failure 
is graded virtually at the moment the work is 
accomplished.
Schedule Performance
The prime schedule concern to the customer, 
AFSSD, is that the boosters be ready at the 
launch complex on the date scheduled for launch. 
To ensure this capability the schedule incentive 
is structured in two parts. One is the PERT/ 
Time incentive which motivates quality/time per­ 
formance on critical events leading to completion 
of the contract milestones. The second part of 
the schedule incentive, the contract milestones, 
requires the on- time completion of airborne 
vehicle and AGE tests at Denver prior to shipment 
to the launch sites.
PERT/Time Incentive2
The score to date is:
TABLE A. INCENTIVE PERT EVENT SCORING
Total Events Events Approved Events 
Scored by the Monitors Disapproved
1st thru llth Incentive 
Quarters
12th Quarter (Current) 
Total to Date
297 
_5 
302
265 32
_5 _0
270 (897.) 32 (HZ)
The reasons for disapproval of the thirty-two 
events fall into two categories:
TABLE B. REASONS FOR IPE DISAPPROVAL
Time Category 
(No. of IPE's Disapproved 
____on a Time Basis)
25 (78Z)
Quality Category Total
(No. of IPE's Disapproved on Disapproved
a Quality/Technical Basis) IPE's
7 (227.) 32 (1007.)
Thus of the 302 IPE's scored to date: 25/302 or 
8.2% were late; and 7/302 or 2.4% were deficient 
in quality. (In each case, the disapproval 
spurred appropriate recovery action — not early 
enough to avoid the incentive penalty, but still 
early enough to forestall serious downstream 
impact.)
In selecting the IPE's both Martin and AFSSD 
recognized the fact that success of the engineer­ 
ing activities is a major factor in overall 
program success. Engineering is "first-in-line". 
It has to. define the hardware before procurement 
or fabrication efforts can begin. Success in 
motivating engineering to release complete 
packages on time enables the procurement buyers 
to shop more effectively, permits the tool 
designers to more thoroughly explore alternate 
producibility concepts, and lessens the produc­ 
tion worker's rework and overtime. Further, we 
believe that the incentives and other program 
control techniques must be in dynamic operation 
during the first 25% of the program, for that 
is where the overall success or failure of the 
program is established. Therefore, almost 40% 
of the total number of IPE's were devoted to 
engineering. The scoring of this coverage is 
shown in the following table:
TABLE C. ENGINEERING IPE PERFORMANCE
The PERT/Time incentive consists of 316 Incentive 
PERT Events (IPE's) which are listed in the 
contract. The criteria used in selecting the 
events used as IPE's is that they be significant, 
definable, and capable of motivating performing 
groups toward successful accomplishment of the 
milestones and other program objectives. During 
the last month of each three-month quarter, the 
PERT/Time tab runs for the next quarter are 
"frozen" by Martin and the Air Force through 
their Incentive Review Monitors, and the 
"expected date" (date for which there is a 50/50 
probability of completing the event) is used to 
measure the IPE's falling into that quarter. 
Detailed descriptions of the events, their 
criteria for quality/technical completion, and 
expected dates are disseminated in a catalog. 
The Monitors then use the Catalog description 
and the "expected date" in scoring success or 
failure.
IPE Coverage*
of Basic Total No. No. of 7. IPE 
Design Packages of IPE's Disapproved IPE's Success
T-III A/B 
Eng ineer ing
T-III AGE 
Engineering
98* 
74Z
987. 
97Z
(*These percentages exclude any redundant events 
such as "P-41 Umbilicals, Design Engineering 
Release Complete" in which the drawings were 
virtually identical to those in a similar and 
earlier P-40 IPE. Since they offered little 
motivation all redundant events were replaced 
by other events which offered more challenge.
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In the fabrication area there have been 172 
IPE's scored to date. These covered procure­ 
ment, tooling, assembly, and test activities. 
In this area we missed 29 IPE's or 16.8%. The 
fabrication cycle IPE performance miss ratio 
of 29/172 compared to the engineering IPE 
performance miss ratio of 3/130 (reference Table 
C) indicates that meeting fabrication events is 
considerably more difficult. A considerable 
amount of "domino impact" (in which missing one 
event on a PERT subnet led to missing subsequent 
events on that same subnet) was noted in the 
fabrication area. Here the process of procure­ 
ment available, build complete, and test complete 
forms a tight series arrangement. On the other 
hand, in the engineering area, the IPE's were 
predominately design release events composed of 
several engineering packages in a parallel 
relationship. For example, basic structure, 
bracketry, plumbing, and installation drawings 
might be the four major packages comprising a 
structures 1 engineering IPE. If, in order to 
prepare a drawing for this IPE the structures 
group needed information that interfaced with 
part of an IPE that the propulsion group was 
working, the engineers invariably arranged among 
themselves to expedite the drawings containing 
such interface data. This parallel flexibility 
is much less available among fabrication events 
whose end items are in a series arrangement and 
usually physically different. (in the few 
instances where there was similarity between two 
items of hardware, in a close time/availability 
relationship, they were invariably a part of the 
same IPE.)
Despite this lack of flexibility the motivation 
generated by IPE's is present in the fabrication 
area, and as Graph D shows, the cumulative trend 
of missed IPE's has become level.
GRAPH D. FABRICATION CUMULATIVE IPE PERFORMANCE
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Milestones
The second part of Martin*s schedule incentive 
deals with the contract milestones. These are 
the on-time and successful completion of the 
combined systems tests of the seventeen space 
boosters and the tests of the three sets of 
AGE vans prior to shipment to the field. These 
major contract delivery dates or milestones were 
set forth in our proposal in September 1962. 
They were then "frozen" into the contract when 
go ahead was received in late December 1962. 
Milestone performance to date is shown in Table E.
TABLE E. CONTRACT MILESTONE SCORING
AGE Van Sets 
Space Boosters
Totals to Date 
(*Space Boosters 1 and 2)
Milestones 
Scored
3
15
18
Milestones 
Approved by 
the Monitors
Milestones 
Disapproved
0
!*
2*
The impact of changes on IPE's is easily handled 
through the application of the criteria via the 
bilateral incentive monitoring system. The 
contract provides that in the event a Class I 
change impacts upon an IPE already fixed in a 
Quarterly Catalog the monitors will temporarily 
excuse the event to allow appropriate recovery 
action by the contractor. Upon receipt of 
contractual direction to perform a Class I change, 
the Martin planners "PERT" the change, the revised 
date is given a critical review by the monitors, 
and Martin performance is measured against the 
new PERT expected date. Class II changes impact­ 
ing on an IPE generate no incentive relief to 
Martin, The milestones are changed only by a 
supplemental agreement to the contract. This 
occurred in mid-program when the remaining mile­ 
stones were rescheduled in order to accommodate 
the addition of live payloads to the flight 
program.
Program Schedule Success
Before leaving the subject of incentives we must 
recall that the purpose for having schedule 
incentives is to have the equipment ready at the 
launch complex on time. This purpose has been 
met. All Martin Titan III equipment has been 
ready for customer use at the launch site on his 
planned launch dates.
Flight Performance
There is an old truism that "the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating". In Martin's Titan III 
development contract the largest proportion of 
the incentive reward or penalty has been placed 
upon flight performance. This is a two type 
incentive.
1 2 3
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First Flight Incentive
The first type of flight performance incentive 
is that placed upon successful and on-time 
launch of the first "A" (core only) booster 
and the first "C" (core plus solids) booster. 
This is a reward only incentive and in order 
for Martin to win we must be on schedule to the 
contract launch date and the transtage must 
meet its final orbital window as specified in 
the contract. As added motivation for proper 
accomplishment of Martin's role as detailed 
integration contractor we lose just as much if 
our associates 1 equipment fails as we lose if 
our equipment fails in achieving the specified 
orbit. The advantage of this type of incentive 
is that it motivates teamwork.
Space Booster Demonstration Incentive
The second part of Martin's flight performance 
incentive is assigned to the operation of the 
Martin equipment in the countdown and flight of 
the other fifteen vehicles in the program. In 
this incentive the countdown and flight opera­ 
tion of each vehicle is worth 100 points. 3 At 
the end of the flight program the points earned 
are converted to dollars of fee reward or 
penalty. As the number of vehicles launched 
increases, the point emphasis shifts toward 
the successful operation of the final stage. 
This progressive distribution of points requires 
improved performance on each of these develop­ 
ment flights in order to avoid penalty.
Results
The Flight performance to date is shown in the 
following table:
TABLE F. FLIGHT PERFORMANCE
Percent
Secondary
of Primary and
Flight Objectives Met
907.
100%
1007.
100%
1007.
817.
90%
Ratio of Incentives
Earned to Incentives
Allocated to that
Flight
07.
100%
100%
100%
100%
Not Yet Established
Not Yet Established
All countdown points have been successfully earned 
by Martin.
Indicative of the successful performance of the 
Titan III "A" vehicle is the fact that the 
government deleted the fifth core vehicle from 
the "A" configuration flight program and has 
reserved it for future use, thus saving 
$17,000,000 of the taxpayer's money. ^
The first flight of the Titan III "C" was a 
complete success. The second and third flights 
experienced difficulties in the final phases 
of flight and did not achieve the planned final 
orbital position.
The performance of the Titan III "A" on its 
first two flights encouraged the mission 
planners to add satellite payloads to vehicle 
3 "A" and 4 "A". These payloads were success­ 
fully placed into orbit. Then, the success of 
the maiden flight of the Titan III "C" further 
encouraged the planners to schedule satellite 
payloads for all of the remaining Titan III "C" 
development flights. The use of live payloads 
with their complex flight profiles necessitated 
a change in the Space Booster Demonstration 
incentive to give emphasis to this element of 
program growth. Therefore, the Air Force and 
Martin added a satellite orbital insertion mea­ 
surement to the flight performance incentives.
Cost Performance
Martin's Titan III Phase II contract has already 
passed the 9070 cost commitment and expenditure 
point. We can confidently state that upon con­ 
tract completion we will be on the target cost.
Although the cost incentive structure in the 
contract presented an opportunity for signifi­ 
cant cost incentive rewards if the program were 
underrun, we will not be able to produce the pro­ 
gram for less than target cost. On the other 
hand, we have avoided the penalties inherent 
if we were to significantly overrun the target 
cost. This exactitude in meeting the target cost 
did not come by accident. During Phase I great 
effort was expended in preparing the detailed 
engineering specifications, in preparing and 
testing the PERT/Time/Cost system, in establish­ 
ing the management plan, in defining the specific 
detailed items of work in each of the contract 
tasks, and in preparing the cost estimate for 
Phase II. Furthermore, once under the Phase II 
contract we found, as we had planned, that the 
IPE schedule incentive motivated people to com­ 
plete their work promptly. As soon as they did 
they were, in accordance with PERT/Cost, operating 
on a new cost suffix (and budget) for their next 
event. The rigid time/completion requirements 
of IPE's also helped to avoid costly delays and 
rework downstream on the program. In addition, 
Martin has an effective cost reduction program 
in which the Titan III program team was credited 
with over $80 million in savings during this 
three year period. An additional sum of over 
$7.5 million was saved by the Value Engineering 
program. In fact, but for the IPE's and the cost 
reduction programs the tight target cost would 
have been overrun. Furthermore, during this 
period we experienced a decline in sales at Denver 
and management had to work vigorously to keep the 
overhead in line.
Both AFSSD and Martin management teamed to curb 
the change activity inherent in a development pro­ 
gram. This management effort combined with the 
excellent program definition obtained during Phase 
I contributed to our success in holding the cost 
impact of specification changes to less than 1% 
of the target cost. These concepts of accurate 
definition and stringent control were also applied 
to the modifications of the contract work state­ 
ment for such items as the addition of live pay- 
loads to the flight test program.
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Conclusion
Martin's successful experiences on the Titan III 
program prove that incentives do work towards 
motivating superior performance. Our experi­ 
ences also show that success is contingent upon; 
(1) an excellent degree of program definition; 
and, (2) the ability of management to bring all 
their people on board as wholehearted partici­ 
pants.
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